Northwestern Journal of Law & Social Policy
Volume 17
Issue 1 Fall

Article 3

Fall 2021

With Unanimity and Justice for All: The Case for Retroactive
Application of the Unanimous Jury Verdict Requirement
Kara Kurland

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njlsp
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Criminal Procedure Commons

Recommended Citation
Kara Kurland, With Unanimity and Justice for All: The Case for Retroactive Application of the Unanimous
Jury Verdict Requirement, 17 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL'Y. 49 (2021).
https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njlsp/vol17/iss1/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern Pritzker School of Law Scholarly
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Northwestern Journal of Law & Social Policy by an authorized
editor of Northwestern Pritzker School of Law Scholarly Commons.

Copyright 2021 by Kara Kurland
Northwestern Journal of Law and Social Policy

Volume 17 (Fall 2021)

With Unanimity and Justice for All: The Case for
Retroactive Application of the Unanimous Jury
Verdict Requirement
Kara Kurland*
ABSTRACT
Until the Supreme Court’s 2020 decision in Ramos v. Louisiana, non-unanimous jury
verdicts were constitutional and utilized in two states: Louisiana and Oregon. The Ramos
decision not only declared the practice of non-unanimous jury verdicts unconstitutional,
but it also emphasized the essential nature of jury verdict unanimity in criminal trials
throughout American history and legal jurisprudence. A year later, in Edwards v. Vannoy,
the Court considered retroactive application of Ramos. Utilizing the test created in Teague
v. Lane that assessed the retroactivity of new rules of criminal procedure, the Court
announced that, despite the essential nature of the unanimous jury verdict requirement, it
was not a “bedrock element of criminal procedure.” Therefore, like every other new rule
of criminal procedure to date, this rule did not apply retroactively. After acknowledging
that the Teague test had never found a new rule of criminal procedure to meet its
demanding standard, Edwards then took the drastic step of eliminating the bedrock
exception to Teague altogether. This Note argues that the Edwards Court was wrong in its
analysis and conclusion to deny hundreds of prisoners relief based on non-unanimous jury
verdicts that were obtained prior to Ramos. Though the Supreme Court has denied relief
to those prisoners, this Note explains that state courts still have the ability to retroactively
apply Ramos and that justice requires state courts to adjudicate non-unanimous jury
verdict claims accordingly.
Keywords: jury verdict, constitutional law, criminal trials, criminal procedure,
retroactivity, Teague, prisoners relief
INTRODUCTION
David Sims was convicted of a felony in 2015 despite two members of the jury
finding him not guilty.1 Based on this unjust verdict, the court sentenced Sims to life in
prison without the possibility of parole.2 Sims appealed his conviction to the Louisiana
* J.D., Northwestern Pritzker School of Law, 2022. Special thanks to Professor Shari Seidman Diamond
for the thoughtful guidance throughout my note writing process. Thank you to my father, Adam Kurland,
for providing this Note with its clever title, a true art form I have yet to master. Finally, thank you to the
members of the Northwestern Journal of Law and Social Policy for the dedication and time spent assisting
me in this publication.
1
State v. Sims, No. 26735-13, 2016 La. App. LEXIS 353, at *12 (La. App. 3d Cir. Sept. 28, 2016).
2
Id. at *2.
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Supreme Court, but the court rejected his claims.3 As a result, Sims exhausted his right to
appeal, which ended the direct review of his conviction. Similarly, Nathaniel Lambert was
convicted by a non-unanimous jury verdict in 1997.4 Even though one juror believed that
Lambert was not guilty, the trial court also sentenced him to life in prison without the
possibility of parole.5 However, the court of appeals ultimately reversed Lambert’s
sentence for reasons unrelated to his non-unanimous jury verdict.6 Presently, more than
twenty years after this reversal, Lambert is still litigating the resentencing that stemmed
from his 1997 conviction on direct review.7
In 2020, the Supreme Court ruled in Ramos v. Louisiana that non-unanimous jury
verdicts such as those imposed on Sims and Lambert are unconstitutional.8 However, the
Court’s ruling in Ramos only applies to cases that are adjudicated after Ramos was decided
or that are currently on direct appeal. As such, while both Sims and Lambert were convicted
by non-unanimous jury verdicts, the current procedural posture of their cases is entirely
different from one another. Sims’s 2015 conviction became final in 2017, meaning that
Ramos did not apply to his case. However, because Lambert’s 1997 convictions and
sentences never became final, he remains on direct appeal and is therefore entitled to a new
trial under Ramos.9 Though Sims was convicted eighteen years after Lambert, he was not
able to benefit from Ramos, and he will remain in prison for the rest of his life based on a
law that the Supreme Court deemed unconstitutional.
—
“Beyond a reasonable doubt” is the highest burden of proof in the American legal
system.10 The intention behind this high burden is to ensure that criminal defendants are,
in fact, guilty with a high degree of certainty before the State deprives them of their
liberty.11 In 1898 and 1934, Louisiana and Oregon, respectively, adopted non-unanimous
jury verdict laws to circumvent this demanding standard.12 As explained by the Supreme
Court, racism and white supremacy motivated these states to enact non-unanimous jury
laws in order to silence minority jurors’ voices.13 By permitting only ten members of the
jury to find a defendant guilty, while two (likely) minority jurors find the defendant not
guilty, these laws allowed a criminal defendant to be convicted despite the existence of
3

State v. Sims, 224 So. 3d 984 (La. 2017).
State v. Lambert, 267 So. 3d 648 (La. App. 4th Cir. 2019); Supplemental Brief for Petitioner at 1,
Lambert v. Louisiana, 267 So. 3d 648 (La. App. 4th Cir. 2019) (No. 19-8149).
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
As of October 5, 2020, Lambert’s case is pending in the Court of Appeals of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit,
under case No. 19-8149.
8
140 S. Ct. 1390 (2020).
9
Lambert v. Louisiana, 141 S. Ct. 225 (2020).
10
See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363–64 (1970).
11
Id.
12
Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1394; id. at 1417 n.86. These laws did not apply to capital cases and did not apply to
first-degree murder charges in Oregon. See LA. CONST. of 1898, art. 116 (“cases in which the punishment
may be capital, by a jury of twelve, all of whom must concur to render a verdict”); OR. CONST. art. I, § 11
(“in the circuit court ten members of the jury may render a verdict of guilty or not guilty, save and except a
verdict of guilty of first-degree murder, which shall be found only by a unanimous verdict”).
13
Id.
4
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reasonable doubt by at least one member of the jury.14 Not only were these laws based in
discrimination, but they also defied historical understandings of the Sixth Amendment’s
guarantee of a trial by an impartial jury. Though the Sixth Amendment does not explicitly
contain this right, if its mandate “carried any meaning at all, it surely included a
requirement as long and widely accepted as unanimity.”15 Supreme Court Justices, legal
treatises, and ample Supreme Court opinions throughout history have repeatedly endorsed
this view.16 Despite this historical and legal understanding of the unanimous jury verdict,
the Supreme Court initially upheld non-unanimous jury verdict laws in 1972, stating that
such laws did not violate either the Sixth or Fourteenth Amendments.17 The Court did not
strike down these laws as unconstitutional until 2020 in Ramos v. Louisiana.18
Even though Ramos now requires unanimous jury verdicts to convict defendants,
hundreds of individuals are already serving prison sentences based on non-unanimous jury
verdicts.19 Ramos did not affect any prisoner whose convictions became final prior to the
day the Supreme Court rendered its decision because new rules of criminal procedure are
typically only applied prospectively.20 If prisoners with finalized convictions choose to
litigate their unconstitutional non-unanimous jury verdicts, they will have to do so on
collateral review. Collateral review, unlike direct review, means that a conviction has
already been finalized, which makes reversal of the conviction more difficult to achieve.21
Until recently, new rules of criminal procedure, such as Ramos’s rule requiring unanimous
jury verdicts, could only apply retroactively to cases on collateral review if they met a
demanding standard that the Supreme Court established in Teague v. Lane.22 According to
Teague, only “watershed” rules of criminal procedure satisfied the Court’s standard for
retroactive application.23 As the Teague Court explained, “watershed rules” are those
which are “absolutely prerequisite to fundamental fairness implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty.”24 Notably, Teague’s understanding of “watershed rule” only applied to
new rules of criminal procedure, not old ones. Old rules, according to Teague,
automatically apply retroactively.25
In December 2020, the Court heard oral arguments in Edwards v. Vannoy to assess
whether Ramos should apply retroactively.26 In May 2021, the Court not only ruled in
14

Id.
Id. at 1396.
16
See id. at 1396–97 (“Justice Story explained in his Commentaries on the Constitution that ‘in common
cases, the law not only presumes every man innocent, until he is proved guilty; but unanimity in the verdict
of the jury is indispensable.’ Similar statements can be found in American legal treatises throughout the
19th century . . . In all, this Court has commented on the Sixth Amendment’s unanimity requirement no
fewer than thirteen times over more than 120 years.”).
17
See Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 367 (1972); see also Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972).
18
Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1390.
19
Brief for The Promise of Justice Initiative, the Louisiana Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, and
the Orleans Public Defender as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 11, Edwards v. Vannoy, 141 S.
Ct. 1547 (2021) (No. 19-5807).
20
See 140 S. Ct. at 1419.
21
Wall v. Kholi, 562 U.S. 545, 551 (2011).
22
489 U.S. 288 (1989).
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
See Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1437 (“Under Teague, ‘an old rule applies both on direct and collateral
review’”) (citing Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 416 (2007)).
26
Transcript of Oral Argument, Edwards v. Vannoy, 141 S. Ct. 1547 (2021) (No. 19-5807).
15
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Edwards that Ramos will not apply retroactively, but it also completely eliminated the
“watershed” exception from the Teague test.27 Though the Court had never held that a new
rule of criminal procedure was retroactive under the Teague test,28 Edwards’s ruling
completely eliminated that possibility by creating a blanket rule that new rules of criminal
procedure will not apply retroactively.29
This Note posits that the Edwards Court incorrectly denied Ramos retroactive
application and patently violated individuals’ constitutional rights by eliminating the
“watershed” exception to the Teague test. By looking to the original understanding of the
Sixth Amendment’s requirement of unanimity, as well as to the constitutionally required
burden of proof to establish guilt, this Note demonstrates that the unanimous jury verdict
requirement is a “watershed” rule of criminal procedure, and, as such, the Edwards Court
should have applied it retroactively.
Alternatively, this Note argues that the Court should not have applied Teague to
Ramos in the first place, as the unanimous jury verdict’s historical nature refutes the
novelty of Ramos’s ruling, negating the Court’s need to rely on Teague. Instead, the
Edwards Court should have found that Ramos did not create a new rule, but rather applied
settled rules concerning the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. If Ramos was an old rule,
the Teague standard would be irrelevant, and the Court would have had to retroactively
apply Ramos.
Fortunately, regardless of the Edwards decision, states can still retroactively apply
ostensibly novel rules of criminal procedure in their own post-conviction proceedings
because the Supreme Court only sets the floor for when new rules apply retroactively.30 By
maintaining autonomy to decide retroactive application of their own state law, both
Louisiana and Oregon can still apply Ramos retroactively and grant new trials to all
criminal defendants that were convicted by non-unanimous jury verdicts prior to the Ramos
decision.
This Note explores the various avenues that the legal system can and should take to
apply Ramos retroactively on collateral review to prisoners with convictions based on nonunanimous jury verdicts. Even though Edwards denied Ramos’s retroactive application,
various arguments in favor of retroactivity remain relevant because state courts can still
grant retroactivity to state prisoners. This Note therefore serves several purposes. First, it
delineates several arguments supporting retroactivity to shed light on the numerous
theoretical frameworks that state court judges can use to arrive at the same ultimate
conclusion. Simultaneously, this Note assesses the Court’s egregious errors in Edwards to
inform subsequent state litigation. Though Edwards is now precedent and impacts both
non-unanimous jury doctrine and retroactivity doctrine, critically analyzing the decision
can decrease its significance, particularly to state post-conviction petitioners. The paths to
achieving retroactivity through Ramos, while limited, do exist in underappreciated and
underutilized ways. Accordingly, legal practitioners must consider all possibilities when
advocating for retroactivity. This Note seeks to persuade practitioners that retroactively
applying Ramos is necessary to secure justice for all incarcerated individuals who remain

27

Edwards v. Vannoy, 141 S. Ct. 1547 (2021).
Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1407.
29
Id.
30
See Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264 (2008).
28
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victims of non-unanimous jury verdicts and advances options to achieve retroactivity on a
state level.
Part I examines the Supreme Court’s retroactivity jurisprudence and highlights the
considerations that culminated in the Court’s current test for retroactivity. Part II reviews
non-unanimous jury verdict jurisprudence to contextualize the issue before the Court in
Edwards. Part III critiques the Edwards decision and supplies an alternative analysis that
argues for retroactively applying Ramos based on the theory that Ramos created a new rule
of criminal procedure. Part IV supplies another alternative analysis that the Court could
have conducted to retroactively apply Ramos based on a theory that Ramos did not declare
a new law. Finally, Part V considers what states can do to facilitate Ramos’s retroactive
application now that the Supreme Court has denied retroactivity of Ramos on collateral
review.
I. HISTORY OF RETROACTIVELY APPLYING NEWLY RECOGNIZED RULES OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE
Until Edwards, the Supreme Court’s decision in Teague v. Lane governed the law on
retroactively applying newly recognized rules of criminal procedure.31 The Teague test
weighed heavily against retroactive application of cases on collateral review for a variety
of reasons. Primarily, the Court found a strong interest in the finality of convictions.
According to Justice Harlan, “No one, not criminal defendants, not the judicial system, not
society as a whole is benefited by a judgment providing a man shall tentatively go to jail
today, but tomorrow and every day thereafter his continued incarceration shall be subject
to fresh litigation on issues already resolved.”32 Retroactive application disrupts the finality
of convictions and therefore deprives criminal law of “much of its deterrent effect.”33
Retroactive application also creates issues involving reliance interests. Applying new law
to old cases can involve retrials, plea bargaining, and other administrative changes, all of
which come with a cost.
Though courts have only applied Teague’s test for the past thirty years, the debate
on retroactively applying newly decided law has a much longer history and continues
today. Prior to Teague, the Court was continuously divided on retroactivity issues, and its
rulings on retroactive application lacked a clear framework, often producing inconsistent
results. Though Teague standardized these results by creating a framework that applied
consistently to cases with the same procedural posture, it also developed a test that no case
has passed. In recognition of this “false promise” the Supreme Court dramatically altered
the Teague test in Edwards v. Vannoy.34
A. The Retroactivity Regime Before Teague v. Lane
For most of its history, the Supreme Court had not addressed retroactivity issues
because the Court rarely created new constitutional protections for criminal defendants. It
was not until 1956 that any Supreme Court Justice discussed the implications of creating
31

Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 300–01 (1989).
Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 691 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
33
Teague, 489 U.S. at 288, 309 (1989).
34
Edwards v. Vannoy, 141 S. Ct. 1547, 1560 (2021).
32
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new constitutional rights or concerned themselves with whether prior defendants could
benefit from their creation.35 In Griffin v. Illinois, the Court held that an Illinois law
requiring all criminal defendants to pay for a transcript of their trial proceedings
unconstitutionally deprived destitute offenders of access to appellate review. 36 In a
concurring opinion, Justice Frankfurter warned that:
[W]e should not indulge in the fiction that the law now announced has
always been the law and, therefore, that those who did not avail themselves
of it waived their rights. It is much more conducive to law’s self-respect to
recognize candidly the considerations that give prospective content to a new
pronouncement of law.37
Justice Frankfurter was clearly aware of the complications that newly recognized rules
created for those whose cases were decided under the old rule, foreshadowing the long
debate that would ensue over the next several decades.
Two years after Griffin, in Eskridge v. Washington State Board of Prison Terms and
Paroles, the Court held that Griffin was controlling and mandated retroactive application
of its ruling.38 The Court reasoned that “[w]e do not hold that a State must furnish a
transcript in every case involving an indigent defendant. But here, as in the Griffin case,
we do hold that destitute defendants must be afforded as adequate appellate review as
defendants who have enough money to buy transcripts.”39 Though the Court did not
explicitly acknowledge it, this was the first time it applied a new rule of criminal procedure
retroactively. Despite the Court’s implicit recognition that the issue of retroactivity may
lend itself to constitutional questions and procedural issues, the Court continued to rule on
similar claims on a case-by-case basis for the next seven years without creating a consistent
framework for retroactivity.40 Meanwhile, Justice Harlan consistently urged the Court to
adopt a real framework for retroactivity in a series of cases from 1961 to 1964.41
Finally, in Linkletter v. Walker the Supreme Court heeded Justice Harlan’s plea and
laid out a test for retroactivity.42 In Linkletter, the Supreme Court addressed the question
of whether Mapp v. Ohio,43 which made the exclusionary rule (a rule that requires
exclusion of illegally obtained evidence) applicable to the states, should apply
retroactively.44 After years of inconsistent retroactive application of new laws, the Court
35

Peter Bozzo, What We Talk About When We Talk About Retroactivity, 46 AM. J. CRIM. L. 13, 28 (2019).
351 U.S. 12 (1956).
37
Id. at 26.
38
357 U.S. 214, 216 (1958).
39
Id.
40
See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964); Smith v. Crouse, 378 U.S. 584 (1964) (per
curiam); Pickelsimer v. Wainwright, 375 U.S. 2 (1963) (per curiam); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963).
41
See Ruark v. Colorado, 378 U.S. 585, 585 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Jackson, 378 U.S. at 439–
40 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Smith, 378 U.S. at 584 (Harlan, J., dissenting); LaVallee v. Durocher, 377 U.S.
998, 998 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari); Pickelsimer, 375 U.S. at 3–4 (Harlan,
J., dissenting); Patterson v. Medberry, 368 U.S. 839, 839–40 (1961) (memorandum of Harlan, J., respecting
the denial of certiorari).
42
381 U.S. 618 (1965).
43
367 U.S. 643 (1961).
44
Linkletter, 318 U.S. at 618.
36
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created a three-pronged approach where retroactivity would be determined by “weigh[ing]
the merits and demerits in each case by looking to the prior history of the rule in question,
its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard its
operation.”45 Using this standard, the Court held that Mapp would apply only prospectively
because retroactively applying Mapp would not assist in achieving Mapp’s purpose of
deterring lawless police action.46
Ultimately, Linkletter’s vague three-pronged test led to inconsistent results in later
cases that adjudicated claims of retroactive application.47 When applying the Linkletter test
to Miranda v. Arizona, the Court employed Miranda’s new rule (that the Fifth Amendment
requires law enforcement officers to advise persons in custody prior to questioning of their
rights to silence and an attorney) to the defendants in Miranda and its companion cases.48
However, when applying the Linkletter test to Johnson v. New Jersey, the Court held that
the defendant could not benefit from the Miranda ruling because Miranda should only
apply to trials that commenced after its decision.49 While the defendant in Johnson was
convicted before the Miranda decision, the defendants in Johnson and Miranda were both
on direct review of their convictions.50 The Court’s refusal to apply Miranda retroactively
in Johnson therefore resulted in unequal treatment of criminal defendants who were
similarly situated.51
While Justice Harlan concurred with the Court’s decision in Johnson, he was
adamant that the Linkletter test should not apply to cases on direct review, but rather only
to cases on collateral review—a distinction that the Linkletter test failed to address. In his
dissenting opinion in Desist v. United States, Harlan advocated for the Court to stop
applying Linkletter to cases on direct review because “all ‘new’ rules of constitutional law
must, at a minimum, be applied to all those cases which are still subject to direct review by
this Court at the time the ‘new’ decision is handed down.”52 Consequently, Harlan also
attempted to explicate a reason for limiting retroactivity of petitions of habeas corpus.
Expounding on the Court’s long-enduring belief that habeas petitions should not be subject
to retroactive application of newly established rules, Harlan explained:
[T]he threat of [collateral review] serves as a necessary additional incentive
for trial and appellate courts throughout the land to conduct their
proceedings in a manner consistent with established constitutional
standards. In order to perform this deterrence function, . . . the [collateral
review] court need only apply the constitutional standards that prevailed at
the time the original proceedings took place.53
According to Harlan, retroactive application of new rules on collateral review was not in
accordance with a prominent purpose of collateral review: to correct errors of previous
45

Id. at 629.
Id. at 633–37.
47
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 302–03 (1989).
48
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
49
Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 732 (1966).
50
Teague, 489 U.S. at 303.
51
Id.
52
Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 258 (1969).
53
Id. at 262–63 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
46
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proceedings according to the rules that existed when the proceeding took place. Harlan’s
concurring opinion in Mackey v. United States laid out two exceptions to this principle.54
His first exception was for new substantive due process rules of criminal law, which he
argued should be “placed on a different footing . . . because [they] represent[] the clearest
instance where finality interests should yield.”55 Harlan explained that “[t]here is little
societal interest in permitting the criminal process to rest at a point where it ought properly
never to repose.”56 Harlan’s second exception involved new procedural rules that are
“implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”57 Harlan expanded on this exception by
explaining that in some situations, “it might be that time and growth in social capacity, as
well as judicial perceptions of what we can rightly demand of the adjudicatory process,
will properly alter our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements that must be found
to vitiate the fairness of a particular conviction.”58 As an example, Harlan referred to the
right to counsel, which had only been established in 1963 in Gideon v. Wainwright,59 but
which was then held as “a necessary condition precedent to any conviction for a serious
crime.”60
As justices continued to point out crucial issues regarding retroactivity, the Linkletter
test continually proved insufficient to address them. For example, the Court encountered
the issue of Linkletter’s application to new substantive law in Robinson v. Neil.61 Holding
that the doctrine of double jeopardy should be applied retroactively, the Robinson Court
created a distinction between “procedural” rules, such as those “bearing on the use of
evidence or on a particular mode of trial,” and “nonprocedural guarantees,” such as “[t]he
prohibition against being placed in double jeopardy.”62 While Linkletter governed new
procedural rules, Robinson involved new substantive rules. This critical distinction
rendered Linkletter irrelevant to the Court’s decision in Robinson and allowed it to apply
the law of double jeopardy retroactively.63
Even more pressing issues surrounding the application of the Linkletter test arose in
a litany of cases that led to disparate treatment of defendants on collateral review. In Solem
v. Stumes, the Court used the Linkletter test to determine that a previous ruling in Edwards
v. Arizona64 did not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review.65 However, after the
Edwards ruling but before the Solem decision, several lower courts had already applied
Edwards to cases on collateral review.66 Thus, some defendants on collateral review prior
54

Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 667 (1971).
Id. at 692–93.
56
Id. at 693.
57
Id. (citing Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
58
Id.
59
372 U.S. 335 (1963).
60
Mackey, 401 U.S. at 694.
61
409 U.S. 505 (1973).
62
Id. at 507–09.
63
According to Peter Bozzo, Robinson suggested that the Justices were moving away from a balancing test
and toward a categorical approach. Substantive rules (such as the Double Jeopardy Clause) would apply
retroactively, while procedural rules (such as the Miranda Warning) would not. See Peter Bozzo, What We
Talk About When We Talk About Retroactivity, 46 AM. J. CRIM. L. 13, 56 (2019).
64
451 U.S. 477 (1981).
65
465 U.S. 638 (1984).
66
See Witt v. Wainwright, 714 F.2d 1069, 1072–74 (11th Cir. 1983); Sockwell v. Maggio, 709 F.2d 341,
343–44 (5th Cir. 1983); McCree v. Housewright, 689 F.2d 797, 800–02 (8th Cir. 1982).
55
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to Solem benefitted from retroactive application of Edwards, while similarly situated
defendants after Solem did not.67 Further diminishing Linkletter’s effect, the Court in
Griffith v. Kentucky rejected the Linkletter standard for cases pending on direct review at
the time a new rule is announced.68 Echoing the sentiment of Justice Harlan, the Court
declared that “failure to apply a newly declared constitutional rule to criminal cases
pending on direct review violates basic norms of constitutional adjudication.”69
Due to subsequent rulings that significantly complicated the Linkletter test, in
addition to the justices’ consistent criticism of that test, the Court granted a writ of certiorari
in Teague v. Lane. In Teague, the Court would finally create a unifying framework to
clarify how questions of retroactivity should be resolved for cases on both direct and
collateral review.
B. 1989: Teague v. Lane
Stemming from a 1977 incident, Frank Teague was convicted of attempted murder,
armed robbery, and aggravated battery in 1979.70 During jury selection, the prosecutor used
all ten peremptory challenges to exclude black jurors.71 A few years later, in 1986, the
Court ruled in Batson v. Kentucky that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment prohibited prosecutors from using peremptory challenges to strike jurors
based on their race.72 In light of the Batson ruling, Teague attempted to have his conviction
overturned on collateral review by arguing that the prosecutor in his case violated the
Constitution by using race-based peremptory challenges.73 Given the Court’s continual
frustration with Linkletter, the Court used Teague as an opportunity to reshape retroactivity
jurisprudence. Due to the complications and inequities of prior legal frameworks regarding
retroactivity, the Teague Court concluded that new rules should always apply retroactively
to cases on direct review but not necessarily to those on collateral review.74 The Court
found that a case announces a new rule when “it breaks new ground or imposes a new
obligation on the States or the Federal Government.”75 In other words, “a case announces
a new rule if the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant’s
conviction became final.”76
Adopting Justice Harlan’s view of retroactivity for cases on collateral review, the
Teague Court declared that a new constitutional rule of criminal procedure would only
apply retroactively to cases on collateral review if it meets one of two conditions: (1) the
rule places “certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the
criminal law-making authority to proscribe,” or (2) the rule pertains to “procedures that . . .
are ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.’”77 The Court further narrowed the scope of
this second exception to “watershed rules of criminal procedure . . . without which the
67

Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 at 305 (1989).
479 U.S. 314 (1987).
69
Id. at 322.
70
Teague, 489 U.S. at 292–93.
71
Id. at 293.
72
476 U.S. 79 (1986).
73
Teague, 489 U.S. at 293.
74
Teague, 489 U.S. at 300.
75
Id. at 301.
76
Id.
77
Id. at 311 (citing Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692–93 (1971)).
68
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likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously diminished.”78 The Court feared that if it
permitted the “[a]pplication of constitutional rules not in existence at the time a conviction
became final,” the Court would “seriously undermine[] the principle of finality which is
essential to the operation of our criminal justice system.”79 Finding that Batson was a new
rule that was neither substantive nor “watershed,” the Court refused to apply it retroactively
to Teague’s case.80
C. 2021: Edwards v. Vannoy
This Note is primarily interested in Edwards v. Vannoy for its contribution to nonunanimous jury verdict jurisprudence, which will be analyzed in depth in the next section.
However, the Edwards Court also altered the Teague test in a significant way, and its
impact on retroactivity jurisprudence requires attention. After thirty-two years of declining
to define any new rule of criminal procedure as “watershed” and consequently refusing to
retroactively apply any new rule of criminal procedure under Teague, the Court concluded
in Edwards that “the watershed exception is moribund.”81 According to the Court, this
theoretical exception “offers false hope to defendants, distorts the law, misleads judges,
and wastes the resources of defense counsel, prosecutors, and courts.”82 Accordingly, the
Edwards Court eliminated the watershed exception to Teague and bluntly declared that
going forward, “[n]ew procedural rules do not apply retroactively on federal collateral
review.”83
II. NON-UNANIMOUS JURY VERDICT JURISPRUDENCE
While Edwards had a critical impact on retroactivity doctrine, its central question
involved the recently declared unconstitutional non-unanimous jury verdict practice. Long
before Edwards was decided, non-unanimous jury verdicts were not only utilized but were
also explicitly constitutional.
A. 1972: Johnson v. Louisiana and Apodaca v. Oregon
Johnson v. Louisiana84 and Apodaca v. Oregon85 were 1972 companion cases
challenging laws in Louisiana and Oregon that permitted non-unanimous jury verdicts.
Though the two cases relied on different constitutional provisions, the Supreme Court
upheld the constitutionality of non-unanimous jury verdicts in both cases.86
The defendant’s initial criminal trial in Johnson occurred prior to the Supreme
Court’s decision in Duncan v. Louisiana, which held that the Sixth Amendment’s
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guarantee to the right to a jury trial applied to the states.87 The Court had already held that
Duncan did not apply retroactively,88 limiting the constitutional issue in Johnson to
whether Louisiana’s non-unanimous jury verdict law violated due process and equal
protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.89 In Johnson, the petitioner argued that nonunanimous jury verdicts violate due process because they inherently imply reasonable
doubt when at least one juror votes not guilty (indicating that the juror had reasonable doubt
about the defendant’s guilt).90 However, the Court held that Louisiana’s non-unanimous
provisions did not violate due process in part because “want of jury unanimity is not to be
equated with the existence of a reasonable doubt.”91 The Court also held that Louisiana’s
non-unanimous scheme did not violate the Equal Protection Clause for two reasons. First,
it served a rational purpose because it reduced expense in the administration of justice.
Second, it was not invidiously discriminatory because it did not vary the difficulty of
proving guilt with the gravity of the offense.92
In dissent, Justice Douglas emphasized the necessity of unanimous verdicts “if the
great barricade known as proof beyond a reasonable doubt is to be maintained.”93 Nonunanimous juries, in Douglas’s opinion, were a “watered down” standard of civil rights
which had a disparate impact on “the lower castes in our society.”94 Foreshadowing later
debates surrounding the reliability of non-unanimous jury verdicts, the dissent warned that
Johnson would lead to less thorough jury deliberation because, as soon as juries attained
their requisite majority, further consideration would not be required, and those in the
minority would lose the opportunity to persuade their fellow jurors of the alternative
outcome.95
Apodaca differed from Johnson in that the defendant’s initial trial occurred after the
Supreme Court’s ruling in Duncan v. Louisiana. Responding to the defendant’s Sixth
Amendment claims, a plurality of the Supreme Court determined that the Sixth
Amendment did not require convictions by unanimous jury verdicts.96 The plurality posited
that juries still represented a cross section of the community despite the absence of a
unanimity requirement and reasoned that the Fourteenth Amendment’s bar against
systematic exclusion of racial minorities from the jury selection process did not mandate
jury unanimity.97 Even under a non-unanimous rule, the plurality found that racial minority
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members’ views would be considered just as rationally by other jury members as they
would be under a unanimity rule.98
In a concurring opinion, Justice Powell provided Apodaca’s necessary fifth vote.
Though Powell conceded that the Sixth Amendment required unanimous jury verdicts in
federal cases, he argued for a “dual-track” rule of incorporation, whereby the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause would not incorporate all of the elements of a federal
jury trial within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment and therefore did not require jury
unanimity in state trials.99 Powell’s “dual-track” approach has since been undermined by
numerous Supreme Court decisions.100 The Court therefore has removed the lynchpin that
provided the fifth vote in Apodaca, rendering the plurality’s decision toothless. This line
of logic became important in Ramos when the Supreme Court considered the prominent
role of stare decisis in non-unanimous jury verdict jurisprudence.
B. 2018 - Louisiana’s Non-Unanimous Jury Campaign
Throughout U.S. history, Louisiana and Oregon have been the only states to adopt
the non-unanimous jury verdict.101 However, on November 6, 2018, Louisiana passed
Constitution Amendment 2, requiring jury unanimity in criminal trials for crimes
committed on or after January 1, 2019.102 Soon after Louisiana’s success, Oregon engaged
in similar efforts to end its non-unanimous jury law via state referendum, but the joint
resolution proposing the referendum failed in the Oregon Senate during the final days of
the 2019 legislative session.103 At that point, Oregon became the only state to continue the
practice of allowing non-unanimous jury verdicts.
C. 2020 - Ramos v. Louisiana
Evangelisto Ramos, a criminal defendant on direct review, was convicted by a nonunanimous jury for a crime that occurred in 2014. Consequently, Ramos—like all other
defendants charged with crimes that occurred prior to January 1, 2019—still faced the
consequences of a non-unanimous jury verdict. Ramos eventually appealed that verdict to
the Supreme Court, where the Court struck down Apodaca and concluded that the Sixth
Amendment’s right to a jury trial—incorporated against the states through the Fourteenth
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Amendment—required a unanimous verdict to convict.104 Citing historical texts, previous
Supreme Court opinions, and writings from the Founders, the Ramos Court made clear that
the Constitution has always intended for the Sixth Amendment to require jury unanimity.105
Though Johnson and Apodaca failed to mention the sordid history that motivated
both Louisiana and Oregon’s non-unanimous jury verdict laws, Justice Gorsuch, writing
for the Ramos plurality, stressed this shameful past. Noting that Louisiana’s nonunanimous jury verdict stemmed from Louisiana’s 1898 constitutional convention,
Gorsuch recited the convention’s avowed purpose “to establish the supremacy of the white
race.”106 Gorsuch continued to emphasize this history, noting that, “with a careful eye on
racial demographics, the convention delegates sculpted a ‘facially race-neutral’ rule
permitting 10-to-2 verdicts in order ‘to ensure that African-American juror service would
be meaningless.’”107 Similarly, Gorsuch noted that Oregon’s non-unanimous jury verdict
laws can be traced to the rise of the Ku Klux Klan and efforts to dilute “the influence of
racial, ethnic, and religious minorities on Oregon juries.”108
Justice Kavanaugh’s concurring opinion also drew on the racist history of the nonunanimous jury laws to support the argument that Apodaca must be overturned.109
Kavanaugh’s opinion recounted the non-unanimous jury rule’s origins and effects,
specifically Louisiana’s desire to “diminish the influence of black jurors, who had won the
right to serve on juries through the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868 and the Civil Rights
Act of 1875.”110 He characterized the approval of such a law “as one pillar of a
comprehensive and brutal program of racist Jim Crow measures against African
Americans.”111 To Kavanaugh, the law’s racist origin strongly supported overturning
Apodaca.
Because Apodaca was based on improper legal reasoning at best, Justice Sotomayor
disputed its precedential potency. In a separate concurrence, Sotomayor argued that
Apodaca should be overturned because it was a “universe of one.”112 Referring to Powell’s
104
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“dual-track” approach to incorporation, both Sotomayor and Kavanaugh recognized that
Powell’s flawed application of Fourteenth Amendment incorporation was the only reason
Apodaca upheld the constitutionality of the non-unanimous jury verdict.113 Powell had
acknowledged that the Sixth Amendment required unanimity, but had also imposed his
now-rejected dual-track incorporation theory to uphold the constitutionality of state nonunanimous jury verdict laws.114 Sotomayor recognized that the Apodaca decision,
therefore, was never legitimate precedent at inception, and so the Court could not uphold
it in Ramos.115
Focusing on the practical implications of overturning precedent, Justice Alito,
writing in dissent, argued that the reliance interests involved in overturning Apodaca
(retrying criminal defendants convicted of felonies by non-unanimous verdicts whose cases
are still pending on direct appeal) would provoke a “‘crushing’ ‘tsunami’ of follow-on
litigation.”116 The plurality conceded that “new rules of criminal procedure usually do
[impose a cost], often affecting significant numbers of pending cases across the whole
country.”117 However, Justice Gorsuch maintained that the potential for significant
subsequent follow-up litigation has not impacted the Court’s decision to apply new rules
retroactively in prior instances.118 As evidence, Justice Gorsuch cited examples of other
cases where the Court created new rules of criminal procedure, which subsequently forced
the Court to vacate and remand hundreds of decisions on direct appeal.119
Justice Alito further argued that a ruling in favor of Ramos would prompt defendants
whose appeals were already exhausted to challenge their non-unanimous convictions
through collateral review.120 Gorsuch responded by minimizing the likelihood that Teague
would allow for this result because “Teague’s test is a demanding one, so much so that this
Court has yet to announce a new rule of criminal procedure capable of meeting it.”121
Ultimately, the plurality set aside this issue “for a future case where the parties [would]
have a chance to brief the issue and [the Court would] benefit from their adversarial
presentation.”122
While the plurality (Justices Gorsuch, Ginsburg, and Breyer) dismissed the
discussion of retroactive application as a matter not currently before the Court, Kavanaugh
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predicted that the Ramos decision would fail the Teague test, meaning that the Court would
not retroactively apply Ramos to cases on collateral review.123
D. 2021 - Edwards v. Vannoy
Less than a month after Ramos was decided, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in
Edwards v. Vannoy to decide whether Ramos should apply retroactively to cases on
collateral review.124 The Edwards Court determined that Ramos declared a new rule of
criminal procedure, but its mandate for unanimous jury verdicts was not a watershed one.125
Though the Court admitted that Ramos was “momentous and consequential,” it could not
be labeled “watershed” because similar momentous and consequential cases that
“fundamentally reshaped criminal procedure throughout the United States and significantly
expanded the constitutional rights of criminal defendants” also did not apply retroactively
on federal collateral review.126 Specifically, the majority cited three types of cases that
relate to the Ramos ruling, none of which applied retroactively: cases involving a jury
right,127 cases that restored the original meaning of the Sixth Amendment,128 and cases that
prevented racial discrimination.129 According to the Court, these three types of cases
dictated that Ramos similarly could not be applied retroactively.130
In dissent, Justice Kagan noted that none of these decisions corresponded to
Ramos.131 Justice Kagan observed that, if a rule implicated only one of these three aspects
of the criminal process, then it may not achieve watershed status.132 For example, Crawford
restored the original meaning of the Sixth Amendment but did not also prevent racial
discrimination and implicate the jury right. However, a rule such as the unanimous jury
verdict that simultaneously implicated a jury right, restored the Sixth Amendment’s
original meaning, and prevented racial discrimination should achieve watershed status.133
To further emphasize Ramos’s essential nature to the criminal process, the dissent
cited previous cases involving the reasonable doubt standard and unanimous jury verdicts,
both of which applied retroactively.134 In In re Winship, the Court established that a jury
must find guilt “beyond a reasonable doubt.”135 Two years later, the Court applied this rule
retroactively in Ivan V. v. City of New York136 because the rule established in Winship was
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“among the essentials of due process and fair treatment.”137 The Edwards dissent compared
Winship to Ramos, analogizing the safeguards that both rules provided to protect innocent
individuals from wrongful convictions.138 According to Justice Kagan, both cases played a
vital role in “the American scheme of criminal procedure[,]” and, thus, Ramos should have
been applied retroactively in Edwards, just as Winship had been applied retroactively in
Ivan V.139
The Edwards dissent also pointed to Burch v. Louisiana,140 which mandated
unanimous jury verdicts for six-person juries, and Brown v. Louisiana,141 which applied
Burch retroactively.142 The dissent emphasized the inherent contradiction that Edwards
created given that the Brown Court had “held retroactive a unanimity requirement, no
different from the one here save that it applied to a smaller jury.”143 The dissent specified
the reasons the Brown Court used to grant retroactivity, namely that six-person nonunanimous jury verdicts “impair the ‘purpose and functioning of the jury,’. . . raise[]
serious doubts about the fairness of [a] trial . . . and fail[] to assure the reliability of [a
guilty] verdict.”144 If the six-person unanimous jury verdict requirement applied
retroactively for these reasons, the dissent argued that precedent dictated that a twelveperson unanimous jury verdict must also apply retroactively.
It is important to note that both Ivan V. and Brown were decided under a retroactivity
regime that existed prior to Teague. The majority in Edwards leaned on this fact to
downplay the significance of these cases and steadfastly held that no new rules of criminal
procedure were ever applied retroactively under Teague.145 While this is technically true,
these pre-Teague cases utilized the same logic and similar standards that Teague
considered when determining retroactivity.146 Given this powerful precedent, the
requirements for retroactive application under Teague, and the inadequate case law on
which the majority relied, the Court was wrong to deny Ramos’s retroactive application on
federal collateral review.
III. WHY THE EDWARDS COURT WAS WRONG: RAMOS PASSES THE TEAGUE TEST
While deliberating on their decision in Edwards, the justices purportedly analyzed
Ramos under Teague to ascertain whether Ramos was a watershed rule.147 In reality, the
137
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Court swiftly denied Ramos’s retroactive application by analogizing to similar precedents
instead of “faithfully appl[ying] [Teague] to [Ramos].”148 Had the Court genuinely applied
Teague to Ramos, it would have reached the opposite conclusion.149
Under the Teague test, newly recognized rules of criminal procedure did not apply
to cases on collateral review unless they were substantive rules or “those procedures
that . . . are ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.’”150 The Teague Court explained
that this second exception applied only to new “watershed rules of criminal procedure.”151
Such watershed rules (1) “alter our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements
essential to the fairness of a proceeding” and (2) “prevent an ‘impermissibly large risk’ of
an inaccurate conviction.”152
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that Gideon v. Wainwright153 was “the only
case that this court identified as qualifying under [the watershed] exception.”154 In Gideon,
the Court held that counsel must be appointed for any indigent defendant charged with a
felony because “any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be
assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him.”155 As the Court explained,
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not
comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and
educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law. If
charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for himself
whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of
evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial without a
proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence
irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and
knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he may have a
perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the
proceedings against him.156
Therefore, denial of representation, the Court went on to reason, created an intolerably high
risk of an unreliable verdict.157 Accordingly, a new procedural rule would not apply
retroactively unless its “primacy and centrality” to fairness and accuracy was akin to the
right to representation.158 Not only do unanimous jury verdicts arguably meet all of the
148
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requirements to pass the Teague test, but they also share similar essential features with the
rights at issue in Gideon. Unanimous jury verdicts are the only type of verdict capable of
indicating guilt beyond a reasonable doubt (a widely applied standard that itself ensures a
fair and accurate trial process) because any dissenting juror indicates the presence of a
reasonable doubt. Therefore, Ramos should have applied retroactively because, as with
Gideon, it satisfied all components of the Teague test.
A. Ramos v. Louisiana Established a New Rule of Criminal Procedure
For the Teague test to apply to a retroactivity analysis, the rule in question must be
considered “new.”159 As stated in Saffle v. Parks, “the explicit overruling of an earlier
holding no doubt creates a new rule.”160 It is undisputed that Apodaca and Johnson dictated
subsequent litigation over jury unanimity by deeming non-unanimous jury verdicts
constitutional. Ramos overruled this precedent.161 Indeed, Edwards declared the
unanimous jury requirement new because Ramos “was not dictated by precedent or
apparent to all reasonable jurists when Edwards’s conviction became final in 2011.”162
Once a rule of criminal procedure is declared “new,” the Court can then analyze it under
the Teague test to determine if it is a “watershed” rule that mandates retroactive application.
B. Unanimous Jury Verdicts Alter the Legal System’s Understanding of the Bedrock
Procedural Elements Essential to a Proceeding’s Fairness
Teague required that a new rule constitute a “bedrock procedural element” of
criminal adjudication in order for it to apply retroactively.163 Relying on Gideon v.
Wainwright as the model example of a rule that implicates such bedrock elements, the
Court in Wharton v. Bockting explained that Gideon created a “profound and sweeping
change” essential to the fairness of a proceeding.164 Any new rule of criminal procedure
must be held in the same regard as Gideon in order to qualify as altering our understanding
of bedrock procedural elements. 165 Ramos satisfied this standard.
i. Constitutionally Requiring Unanimous Jury Verdicts Created a Sweeping Change
The concept of “sweeping change” is not just a numbers game. Gideon declared that
the right to counsel was a “sweeping change” essential to the fundamental fairness of trials
because “lawyers in criminal court are necessities.”166 This ruling created a widespread
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impact on indigent criminal defendants across the country.167 When assessing whether new
rules of criminal procedure met Teague’s high demands, the Court repeatedly ruled that
laws affecting a narrow class of cases did not meet this “sweeping” standard.168 It may be
difficult to imagine that Ramos’s ruling requiring unanimous jury verdicts could be
considered “sweeping” because forty-nine states already required unanimous jury verdicts
when Ramos was decided.169 However, when Gideon was decided, twenty-two states
submitted amicus curie briefs to the Court to support their already-implemented practice
of providing attorneys to all indigent defendants.170 Regardless, Ramos’s ruling had a
sweeping impact. The dissent in Ramos correctly emphasized that the majority’s ruling is
not limited to Louisiana or Oregon because every other state previously had the ability to
implement a non-unanimous jury verdict practice.171 The mandate of unanimous jury
verdicts is therefore sweeping because every criminal jury trial requires a jury verdict, and
Ramos altered that requirement by announcing a constitutional mandate for jury unanimity
in every criminal trial in every state.
ii. Unanimous Juries are Essential to the Fundamental Fairness of Trials
When assessing whether new laws are “essential to the fairness of a proceeding,” the
Court has held that new laws must do more than affect an incremental change. 172 The
Court’s holding in Ramos that unanimous jury verdicts are constitutionally required
remedied the practice of non-unanimous jury verdicts, which had betrayed the “guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt” standard.173 This standard was, and remains, one of the
foundations of the American legal system,174 and restoring it to its full potency by requiring
unanimous jury verdicts created more than an incremental change in the bedrock
procedural elements essential to fundamental fairness.
The justices’ debate over the “guilt beyond a reasonable doubt” standard, especially
in Johnson, illustrates this standard’s importance in the American legal system. As far back
as 1895, the Court in Davis v. United States stated that the “beyond a reasonable doubt
standard” is implicit in “constitutions . . . [which] recognize the fundamental principles that
are deemed essential for the protection of life and liberty.”175 The Court reaffirmed this
167
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position in 1970, finding that the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard is “basic in our law
and rightly one of the boasts of a free society[]” and, as such, “is a requirement and a
safeguard of due process law in the historic, procedural content of due process.”176 As
Justice Marshall explained a couple of years later in his Johnson dissent, it does “violence
to language and logic to say that the government has proved the defendant’s guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt” when a verdict includes one or two dissenting jurors.177 In Johnson’s
majority opinion, Justice White argued that non-unanimous jury verdicts do not violate the
“beyond a reasonable doubt standard . . . [because] [t]hat rational men disagree is not itself
equivalent to a failure of proof by the State, nor does it indicate infidelity to the reasonabledoubt standard.”178 However, by admitting that those dissenters are indeed “rational men,”
it follows that their doubt is also reasonable. Unanimous jury verdicts, therefore, eliminate
reasonable doubt from the jury deliberation process and restore the constitutionally
mandated burden of proof for criminal conviction to “beyond a reasonable doubt.”
During oral arguments in Edwards, Justice Kagan insinuated that non-unanimous
jury verdicts betrayed the reasonable doubt standard: “[w]e cannot imagine [the reasonable
doubt standard] being viewed as anything less than fundamental to our entire system.”179
Kagan’s dissent in Edwards elaborated further, pointing out that the Court gave “complete
retroactive effect” to the rule that a jury must find guilt “beyond a reasonable doubt” in In
re Winship.180 The dissent went on to analogize In re Winship to Ramos, declaring that the
rules from both cases safeguard individuals from unjust convictions and that they “play[]
a ‘vital’ part in ‘the American scheme of criminal procedure.’”181 In sum, because
unanimous jury verdicts restored the “guilt beyond a reasonable doubt standard” to
criminal proceedings, their requirement in all jury trials undoubtedly altered the bedrock
procedural elements essential to the fairness of a proceeding.
C. Unanimous Jury Verdicts are Necessary to Prevent an Impermissibly Large Risk of an
Inaccurate Conviction
For a new rule to meet the Teague test’s accuracy requirement, “it is not enough to
say that the rule is aimed at improving the accuracy of trial . . . or that the rule is directed
toward the enhancement of reliability and accuracy in some sense.”182 The Court demands
a higher standard: that the new rule remedy an “impermissibly large risk of inaccurate
conviction.”183
Years of social science research prove that unanimous jury verdicts are critical to
ensuring the accuracy and reliability of convictions.184 Such studies confirm that
unanimous jury verdicts strengthen the deliberation process and reduce the likelihood of
wrongful convictions through longer and more thorough debate that requires the
176

In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 362 (citing Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 802–03 (1952)).
Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 401 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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Id. at 362.
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183
Id.
184
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consideration of the viewpoints of women and minorities.185 For example, a 2018 study of
199 serious felony guilty verdicts by non-unanimous juries in Louisiana confirmed that
Louisiana’s non-unanimity rule effectively suppressed the views of racial minorities.186
Requiring unanimity, on the other hand, ensures that jurors who share a majority viewpoint
must still consider and respond to the views of jurors in the minority, thereby increasing
the accuracy of verdicts.187 Together, these studies provide convincing evidence that
unanimous jury verdicts are necessary to promote accurate convictions.
Statistics on wrongful convictions by non-unanimous juries also indicate the need
for unanimity. Of the sixty-two defendants who were wrongly convicted and later
exonerated in Louisiana, thirty-three were tried in a manner that permitted a defendant to
be convicted by a non-unanimous verdict.188 Of these thirty-three defendants, at least
fifteen were convicted by a non-unanimous jury verdict.189 These fifteen innocent
individuals spent a combined 237 years and 9 months in prison.190 Furthermore, nine of
those fifteen wrongfully convicted in Louisiana were tried in proceedings that lasted less
than a day.191 Because social science has identified the correlation between the
thoroughness of deliberation and the accuracy of the subsequent verdict, it seems likely
that non-unanimous jury verdicts played a critical role in wrongfully convicting these
defendants.192
Innocence Project New Orleans (IPNO), a nonprofit organization that seeks to
exonerate innocent prisoners in Louisiana, has built upon previous research of wrongful
convictions, specifically those that were based on non-unanimous jury verdicts. By
extensively researching and investigating current cases of wrongful convictions based on
non-unanimous jury verdicts that have yet to be resolved, IPNO estimates that at least 100
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Id. at 5, 9.
Thomas Ward Frampton, The Jim Crow Jury, 71 VAND. L. REV. 1593, 1599 (2018).
187
See Valerie P. Hans, Deliberation and Dissent: 12 Angry Men Versus the Empirical Reality of Juries, 82
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 579, 587 (2007) (“In juries required to reach unanimity, jurors understandably pay more
attention to those who hold minority views; furthermore, those attempting to argue a minority position
participate more in the discussion and have more influence.”).
188
Brief of Amicus Curiae Innocence Project New Orleans at 3, Edwards v. Vannoy, 141 S. Ct. 1547
(2021) (No. 19-5807). Of note, Louisiana’s non-unanimous verdict rule did not apply to first degree murder
charges.
189
Id.; The number is “at least fifteen” because not every jury trial is polled. Thus, it is possible that some
individuals were wrongfully convicted based on a non-unanimous jury verdict, but there is no evidence to
prove it.
190
The 15 known non-unanimous cases are: (1) State v. Reginald Adams, Orleans Parish Case No. 278951; (2) State v. Gene Bibbins, East Baton Rouge Parish Case No. 2-87-979; (3) State v. Gerald Burge, St.
Tammany Parish Case No. 147,175; (4) State v. Royal Clark, Jefferson Parish Case No. 02-0895; (5) State
v. Catina Curley, Orleans Parish Case No. 461-907; (6) State v. Glenn Davis, Jefferson Parish Case No. 924541; (7) State v. Larry Delmore, Jefferson Parish Case No. 92-4541; (8) State v. Douglas Dilosa, Jefferson
Parish Case No. 87-105; (9) State v. Robert Hammons, St. Tammany Parish Case No. 136- 658; (10) State
v. Travis Hayes, Jefferson Parish Case No. 97-3780; (11) State v. Willie Jackson, Jefferson Parish Case No.
87-205; (12) State v. Terrence Meyers, Jefferson Parish Case No. 92- 4541; (13) State v. Michael Shannon,
Orleans Parish Case No. 478-693; (14) State v. Kia Stewart, Orleans Parish Case No. 464-435; (15) State v.
Archie Williams, East Baton Rouge Case No. 01-83-0234.
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Brief of Amicus Curiae Innocence Project New Orleans at 11, Edwards v. Vannoy, 141 S. Ct. 1547
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current innocent prisoners in Louisiana were convicted by non-unanimous jury verdicts.193
Another nonprofit organization, The Promise of Justice Initiative (PJI), has also engaged
in extensive research to identify all current Louisiana prisoners who were convicted by
non-unanimous jury verdicts regardless of claims of innocence. Through datasets provided
by published studies, research of court records, and outreach to inmates and families, PJI
has identified 1,677 individuals that are currently incarcerated based on non-unanimous
jury verdict convictions.194

193

These 100 individuals are current IPNO clients or people that have had their cases selected for current or
future investigation by IPNO because facts in their cases match indicators of actual innocence. While IPNO
has received thousands of applications from people claiming to be innocent, it does not have the resources
to investigate every case. Therefore, IPNO prioritizes cases through a grading system, setting for
investigation those cases which receive one of its top two grades. These grades mean that, based on
information provided by the applicant and the existing court record, “[n]ew evidence appears to give strong
indication of innocence” or the “[o]riginal conviction [is] based on [a] weak case or new evidence appears
to partially undermine the state’s case.” Brief of Amicus Curiae Innocence Project New Orleans at 15 n.14.
194
Brief of Amici Curiae The Promise of Justice Initiative, the Louisiana Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers, and the Orleans Public Defender at 5–7, Edwards v. Vannoy, 141 S. Ct. 1547 (2021) (No. 195807). Amici describes their methodology for identifying non-unanimous cases in great detail:
We began with the data-set used in the Pulitzer Prize winning series by The Advocate.
See Advocate Staff Report, Tilting the scales, The Advocate (Apr. 1, 2018),
https://www.nola.com/article_25663280- c298-53ef-8182-9a8de046619c.html; see also
Jeff Adelson, Download data used in The Advocate’s exhaustive research in ‘Tilting the
scales’ series, The Advocate (Apr. 1, 2008), https://www.nola.com/article_25663280c298-53ef-8182-9a8de046619c.html. We checked every single case, removing
duplicates, the deceased and those released from prison. We continued our investigation
in district courts and appellate courts throughout Louisiana, seeking non-unanimous jury
verdicts outside the time range analyzed by The Advocate.
We searched through online court records, court of appeals records, records held at the
Louisiana State University law library, and reviewed and requested copies of court
records in parishes across the state. Additionally, we conducted outreach and education
potentially reaching more than 15,000 people incarcerated in Louisiana Department of
Public Safety and Corrections. We engaged in direct or broadcasted communication with
more than 6610 people in Louisiana prisons. We were included in partner organization
surveys and newsletters reaching more than 1000 incarcerated people and more than
10,000 of their families and loved ones. We did outreach to hundreds of defense attorneys
across the state, and hosted multiple community forums with family members of people
with non-unanimous jury verdicts.
After the Ramos opinion issued, amici LACDL engaged with the criminal defense bar to
educate lawyers on the need to timely file pursuant to La. C. Cr. P. Art. 930.8, and
offered continuing legal education with PJI to lawyers engaged in the practice.
Simultaneously, amici distributed questionnaires and information to community
organizations, family members of people incarcerated, inmate counsel and individuals in
prison. Amici held meetings in prisons across Louisiana, engaging with inmate counsel
and entire groups of incarcerated people. Combining our own research from publicly
available sources with outreach we received from people in prison, we have identified
1677 individuals with non-unanimous convictions: that includes all of the people
represented by the private bar, everyone currently on direct appeal and every individual
in any of the prisons requesting representation.
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Extrapolating from IPNO and PJI’s statistics, an estimated 6% of non-unanimous
jury verdicts have resulted in wrongful convictions.195 Though a wrongful conviction rate
of 6% may not seem like “an impermissibly large risk of inaccurate conviction,” this rate
means that slightly more than one in twenty defendants convicted by a non-unanimous jury
verdict in Louisiana are possibly innocent. While the Court has never defined
“impermissibly large risk,” the language from which the Court derives this standard
originates in Paul Mishkin’s The Supreme Court, 1964 Term.196 There, Mishkin analyzed
the writ of habeas corpus’s purpose, asserting that its function is to provide “a prompt and
efficacious remedy for whatever society deems to be intolerable restraints.”197 Given the
recent mass movements for criminal justice reform and widely publicized attention paid to
people who have spent decades in prison for crimes they did not commit,198 a 6% wrongful
conviction rate due to a law that was designed to achieve these results may very well be
viewed as “an impermissibly large risk of inaccurate conviction” by societal standards.
By design, the Teague test was almost impossible to meet. It is, therefore, no surprise
that the Court never found a new rule of criminal procedure that met it.199 The majority in
Edwards grappled with this reality, describing Teague as an “empty promise” because it
failed to establish the remedy it was designed to achieve.200 When measured against
Teague’s nearly impossibly high standards and the “gold standard” established in Gideon,
new rules of criminal procedure will almost always fail to remedy an impermissibly high
risk of inaccurate conviction or match the Court’s view of the absolute need for counsel.
However, even criminal representation cannot safeguard against the loss of the beyond-areasonable-doubt protection inherent in non-unanimous jury verdicts. As such, in order for
the legal system to achieve “ordered liberty,” a criminal defendant should have the right to
a unanimous jury verdict, and this right should be applied retroactively.
Ultimately, the Edwards Court determined that if a rule as “fundamental,”
“essential,” “vital,” and “indispensable” as one that mandated unanimous jury verdicts in
state trials was not watershed, then nothing can or ever will be.201 The Court, of its own

While there may be a handful of additional individuals not yet identified, we believe we
have successfully identified every individual who wants to litigate the constitutionality of
their non-unanimous conviction.
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One hundred current prisoners convicted by a non-unanimous jury verdict in Louisiana that IPNO
estimates are innocent divided by the 1,677 individuals currently incarcerated based on non-unanimous jury
verdict convictions equals a rate of 6% non-unanimous jury verdict conviction resulting in a wrongful
conviction. Brief of Amicus Curiae Innocence Project New Orleans, supra note 188, at 14–17.
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See Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 262 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“The greatly expanded
writ of habeas corpus seems at the present time to serve two principal functions . . . First, it seeks to assure
that no man has been incarcerated under a procedure which creates an impermissibly large risk that the
innocent will be convicted”) (citing Paul J. Mishkin, The Supreme Court, 1964 Term, 79 HARV. L. REV. 56,
78 (1965)).
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Mishkin, supra note 196, at 78.
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See THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://www.innocenceproject.org/about/ (last visited Dec. 8, 2020); see
also THE NATIONAL REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS,
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/about.aspx (last visited July 7, 2021) (2,832
exonerations since 1989 and more than 25,265 years lost collectively in prison due to wrongful
convictions).
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Id. at 1559.
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volition, then took the drastic step of eliminating the watershed exception to Teague.202
Had Edwards properly analyzed Ramos under the Teague test, it would have understood
the watershed rule that Ramos had created and left Teague intact.
IV. WHY THE EDWARDS COURT WAS WRONG: RAMOS DID NOT DECLARE A NEW RULE
Prior to Edwards, once the Court established that a rule of criminal procedure was
new, it used Teague to determine whether the rule applied retroactively. However, when
determining whether an old rule of criminal procedure applied retroactively, the Court did
not, and still does not, apply Teague.203 Edwards explicitly focused on new rules of
criminal procedure, so its holding does not change how the Court analyzes old rules.204
Since Ramos overturned precedent and created a new rule under Edwards, it
necessarily repudiated that very precedent.205 Justice Kavanaugh emphatically
characterized Apodaca as “egregiously wrong,” not just in the present day, but when it was
initially decided.206 Additionally, the emphasis Ramos placed on the historic
constitutionality of unanimous jury verdicts undermined the very idea that Apodaca could
ever qualify as precedent. Accordingly, if Apodaca was never valid precedent and the
historical understanding of the Sixth Amendment always required unanimous jury verdicts,
then Edwards should not have applied Teague because Ramos did not establish a new rule
but only affirmed an old one.
Ramos repeatedly emphasized the historical origins of unanimous jury verdicts and
reaffirmed their constitutional guarantee by way of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.
When explaining the unanimous jury verdict’s deep roots, Justice Gorsuch noted that,
although this concept stemmed from fourteenth-century England, the understanding that
the jury trial right entailed a guarantee of unanimity traveled over to “the young American
States,” which “appeared to regard unanimity as an essential feature of the jury trial.”207
While multiple states explicitly required unanimity in their state constitutions, other states
“preserved the right to a jury trial in more general terms.”208 It is therefore likely that when
the Constitution was ratified,“[i]f the term ‘trial by an impartial jury’ carried any meaning
at all, it surely included a requirement as long and widely accepted as unanimity.”209
Influential treatises, including Nathan Dane’s 1824 Digest of American Law and Justice
Story’s 1833 Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, reflected this
understanding, demonstrating that this founding viewpoint continued to dominate legal
thought well after the Founding generation’s heyday.210
202
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Chaidez v. United States, 568 U.S. 342, 347 (2013) (“Only when we apply a settled rule may a person
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As Justice Gorsuch observed in Ramos, the Court has “commented on the Sixth
Amendment’s unanimity requirement no fewer than thirteen times over 120 years”211 in
cases as old as Thompson v. Utah212 and as new as United States v. Haymond.213 In fact, a
multitude of cases spanning centuries of Supreme Court jurisprudence affirm that
unanimous jury verdicts are a mandatory aspect of federal criminal trials based on the
history of the Constitution.214 As the Court in Johnson elaborated,
[I]n amending the Constitution to guarantee a right to a jury trial, the
framers desired to preserve the jury safeguard as it was known to them at
common law. At the time the Bill of Rights was adopted, unanimity had
long been established as one of the attributes of a jury conviction at common
law.215
If the Sixth Amendment always required unanimous jury verdicts in federal criminal trials,
then the appropriate interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment as established in Duncan
v. Louisiana requires that jury unanimity applies to the states as well.216 Because the Sixth
Amendment’s right to a unanimous jury verdict is fully incorporated against the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment, Ramos did not create a new rule; rather, it simply
applied settled interpretations of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to affirm an old
one.217 From this perspective, Apodaca was egregiously wrong due to its fundamental
misunderstanding of incorporation and inaccurate interpretation of the Sixth Amendment;
consequently, Apodaca loses its power and legitimacy as precedent.
The Ramos plurality acknowledged that “Apodaca yielded no controlling opinion at
218
all.” To add insult to injury, previous Supreme Court jurisprudence explicitly rejected
Apodaca as nothing more than an anomaly and the “result of an unusual division among
the justices.”219 Though Teague defined new laws as those that overturn precedent, the very
institution that established Apodaca as precedent repeatedly denounced its improper ruling
and repudiated its flawed logic. Poignantly, no Supreme Court case ever relied on Apodaca
in reaching a decision, let alone endorsed its reasoning.220 The Court’s repeated acts to
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See 170 U.S. 343, 351 (1898) (“When Thompson's crime was committed, it was his constitutional right
to demand that his liberty should not be taken from him except by the joint action of the court and the
unanimous verdict of a jury of twelve persons.”).
213
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undermine Apodaca’s precedential power hinder the argument that Ramos declared new
law because Ramos overturned a law that was never constitutionally sound.
Unlike cases in which the Court declared a new rule by overturning existing
precedent but refused to retroactively apply that new rule, Ramos more closely resembles
Gideon v. Wainwright.221 Though Gideon was decided prior to Teague, the Court stated
that it is the only case that would justify retroactive application if it had undergone the
Teague analysis.222 Gideon overturned Betts v. Brady,223 a decision that, like Apodaca, was
“an anachronism when handed down” and “departed from the sound wisdom upon which
[prior precedent] rested.”224 By returning to previously established and accepted law,
Gideon explained that “we but restore constitutional principles established to achieve a fair
system of justice.”225 The Ramos plurality similarly viewed the restoration of unanimous
jury verdicts as the restoration of our constitutional promise of a “trial by impartial jury.”226
Though no specific subsequent case declared Gideon retroactive (because retroactive
application at that point was not dictated by a consistent test), the Supreme Court
consistently applied Gideon retroactively, typically without discussion.227 Gideon,
therefore, serves as a firm analog to Ramos in its restoration of previously accepted law
and its subsequent retroactive application.
As the Ramos dissent stressed “[i]f Apodaca was never a precedent and did not
disturb what had previously been established, it may be argued that [the Ramos decision]
does not impose a new rule but instead merely recognizes what the correct rule has been
for many years.”228 On this point, the dissent was entirely correct. Old rules of criminal
procedure were and are not subjected to Teague’s “watershed status” requirement. Instead,
they simply apply retroactively.229 Fortunately, although Edwards declared that Ramos had
imposed a new rule, states are under no obligation to replicate this ruling in their own
courts. Rather, state courts have the freedom to declare that Ramos did not impose a new
rule and apply it retroactively.
V. STATES CAN STILL APPLY RAMOS RETROACTIVELY
Danforth v. Minnesota declared that Teague was “intended to limit the authority of
federal courts to overturn state convictions—not to limit a state court's authority to grant
relief for violations of new rules of constitutional law when reviewing its own State’s
convictions.”230 According to the Court, “[a] close reading of the Teague opinion makes
clear that the rule it established was tailored to the unique context of federal habeas and
E.g., Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406 (2007) (holding that the Court’s opinion in Crawford v.
Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), was a new rule because it overturned Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56
(1980)).
222
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223
316 U.S. 455 (1942).
224
Brief of Amici Curiae Former Judges, Prosecutors, and Judges at 11, Edwards v. Vannoy, 141 S. Ct.
1547 (2021) (No. 19-5807) (citing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963)).
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See Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109 (1967); Arthur v. Colorado, 380 U.S. 250 (1965); Doughty v.
Maxwell, 376 U.S. 202 (1964); Pickelsimer v. Wainwright, 375 U.S. 2 (1963).
228
Ramos, 140 S. Ct at 1437.
229
Id. at 1438.
230
552 U.S. 264, 280–81 (2008).
221

74

Vol. 17:1]

Kara Kurland

therefore had no bearing on whether States could provide broader relief in their own postconviction proceedings than required by that opinion.”231 As such, regardless of Edwards,
Danforth grants states the authority to determine the retroactivity of federal constitutional
rights and the leeway to make that decision in whatever manner they choose, so long as
their state law encompasses “at least as broad a scope as the . . . Supreme Court requires.”232
Indeed, several state courts have heeded Danforth’s call and diverged from the
Supreme Court’s retroactivity analysis. After the Supreme Court’s decision in Miller v.
Alabama,233 which forbade mandatory life sentences for juvenile offenders, the
Connecticut Supreme Court decided to apply Miller retroactively in Casiano v.
Commissioner of Correction.234 Opting to use the Teague analysis, the Casiano court
decided that Miller had created a new watershed rule of criminal procedure.235 Several
months later, the Supreme Court similarly deemed Miller’s ruling retroactive in
Montgomery v. Louisiana.236 However, the Montgomery Court based its decision on a
different premise: that Miller had created a new substantive rule, bypassing Teague’s
“watershed status” analysis.237 Due to Danforth’s support for autonomy, Casiano’s
analysis of Miller as a “watershed rule” and the precedent it set for the Connecticut
Supreme Court remains binding. If Louisiana and Oregon opt to use the Teague analysis
when assessing Ramos’s retroactivity in a state post-conviction petition, they are similarly
free to reach a different conclusion than did the Supreme Court.
In addition to co-opting Teague, states have bypassed issues involving the Teague
test by choosing not to use it in the first place when assessing retroactivity. State v.
Whitfield, a Missouri Supreme Court case decided prior to Danforth, similarly set forth the
principle that federal constitutional law “did not set a . . . ceiling on when new procedural
rules will be applied to other cases, but rather a floor.”238 In other words, the Supreme
Court gave states autonomy to apply new criminal procedural rules to cases on collateral
review and to decide the manner in which they would make that determination, even when
the Supreme Court had denied retroactive application of the same rule. When determining
whether the Supreme Court’s decision in Ring v. Arizona,239 which held that a jury (as
opposed to a judge) must find aggravating factors in order to determine a defendant’s death
sentence, applied retroactively, the Whitfield court invoked Missouri’s traditionally used
Linkletter-Stovall test instead of the Teague test.240 Based on the Linkletter-Stovall test, the
Missouri Supreme Court decided that Ring applied retroactively to post-conviction
cases.241 A year later, in Schriro v. Summerlin, the Supreme Court held that Ring would
not apply retroactively on collateral review.242 However, because states do not always have
to follow the Supreme Court’s rulings (because states have broad authority to apply new
231
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rules retroactively), Schriro had no effect on the Whitfield decision or its precedential effect
on subsequent Missouri state cases. Similarly, Louisiana and Oregon are under no
obligation to use the Teague analysis in order to decide whether the requirement of
unanimity should be retroactive in those states. Rather, they have extremely broad authority
to decide if Ramos will apply retroactively in their courts based on whatever determinative
factors they see fit.
No matter how liberating Danforth and the principle it espouses may seem, very few
states have taken the initiative to conduct their own retroactivity analyses. Most states have
adopted the Teague test and continue to use this standard when determining retroactive
application.243 In fact, Louisiana adopted the Teague test when assessing its state postconviction claims in 1992.244 However, in a swath of recent concurring and dissenting
opinions, the former Chief Justice of the Louisiana Supreme Court, Bernette Johnson, has
repeatedly called on the court to abandon Teague.245 In an opinion opposing the denial of
a writ of certiorari, for example, Johnson argued that the court needs to adopt a new rule
for retroactivity that “takes into account the harm done by the past use of non-unanimous
jury verdicts in Louisiana courts.”246 Johnson explained that the court is not bound by
Teague and that:
[I]f concerns of comity and federalism ultimately mean that the federal
courts do not force us to remedy those convictions which are already final
through a writ of habeas corpus, the moral and ethical obligation upon
courts of this state to address the racial stain of our own history is even more
compelling . . . .247
Accordingly, the Chief Justice argued that Teague should be replaced with a test that
“includes a consideration of whether a stricken law had a racist origin, has had a
disproportionate impact on cognizable groups or has otherwise contributed to our state’s
history of systemic discrimination against African Americans.”248 According to the Chief
Justice, Ramos would apply retroactively under this test.249
In 1972, the Oregon Supreme Court understood retroactivity as operating just as
Danforth commanded: “[W]e are free to choose the degree of retroactivity or prospectivity
243
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which we believe appropriate to the particular rule under consideration, so long as we give
federal constitutional rights at least as broad a scope as the United States Supreme Court
requires.”250 However, after the Supreme Court created a federal rule for retroactivity in
Teague, the Oregon Supreme Court assumed that Teague mandatorily applied to the
states.251 Danforth explicitly repudiated this interpretation, returning Oregon to its 1972
understanding of retroactivity.252 To date, the Oregon Supreme Court has not explicitly
adopted a standard for retroactivity in light of Danforth.253
However, now that Edwards has overruled Teague and eliminated the watershed
exception, states that typically mirror federal law will likely reevaluate their retroactivity
test and may be less inclined to follow the traditional Teague analysis. While such a trend
can provide state petitioners with greater potential for relief, a state-court move toward
Edwards would completely eliminate relief for all state petitioners seeking retroactive
application of any new rule of criminal procedure. Fortunately, Edwards does not
foreseeably affect Danforth. In fact, Edwards explicitly maintained that states still “remain
free, if they choose, to retroactively apply the jury-unanimity rule as a matter of state law
in state post-conviction proceedings.”254 If state courts appreciate Edwards’s flawed
nature, they likely will not adopt the new federal rule on retroactivity, nor will they apply
it to state post-conviction petitioners seeking relief based on their non-unanimous jury
verdicts.
Danforth claims aside, proponents of retroactively applying Ramos in Oregon have
suggested that state petitioners on collateral review can bypass a retroactivity analysis and
instead rely on Oregon’s state-level post-conviction statute.255 Though post-conviction
petitioners in Oregon would typically be procedurally barred from bringing claims they did
not already bring on direct appeal, § ORS 138.550 spells out a few exceptions. According
to § ORS 138.550, the procedural limitations for filing for post-conviction relief can be
bypassed via “escape clauses.”256 Escape clauses permit a petitioner to bring a claim that
would otherwise be procedurally barred if the grounds on which a petitioner relies were
not or could not have been reasonably asserted previously.257 Further, when the grounds
on which a petitioner relies are “novel, unprecedented, or surprising” and not merely an
extension of settled or familiar rules, it becomes more likely that the grounds for relief
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qualify under the escape clauses.258 Because Edwards held that Ramos declared a new rule,
it is likely that post-conviction petitioners in Oregon will not be procedurally barred
because, prior to Ramos, non-unanimous jury verdicts were continually upheld as
constitutional.259 Thus, petitioners could not have reasonably asserted that their nonunanimous jury verdicts violated the Sixth Amendment before Ramos was decided.260
Proponents of retroactively applying Ramos in Oregon posit that once a court
determines that a petitioner is not procedurally barred from their post-conviction claim (and
thus, can move forward with their claim), the court should skip the subsequent retroactivity
analysis and instead simply redress meritorious Ramos claims.261 The Oregon State
Legislature designed the Post-Conviction Hearing Act to address the same concerns that
underly traditional retroactivity doctrines: “balanc[ing] the competing concerns of
efficiency in the courts, finality and repose of convictions, accuracy of the original criminal
proceeding, and fundamental fairness to criminal defendants.”262 As such, the proceduralbar and escape-clause analysis address the same issues that underlie retroactivity doctrines,
making the retroactivity analysis redundant and unnecessary.263
Evidence of discriminatory convictions of minorities in Louisiana also supports
retroactively applying Ramos to prisoners who were convicted with non-unanimous jury
verdicts in state post-conviction proceedings. In Louisiana, 80% of people still imprisoned
based on a non-unanimous jury verdicts are black, a disproportionately high rate since only
67.5% of Louisiana’s overall prison population is black.264 Given the law’s explicitly racist
history in Louisiana and its goals of silencing black jurors and incarcerating even more
black people, the intended discriminatory effects of this law have clearly come to
fruition.265 Additionally, 62% of people with non-unanimous jury verdict convictions are
serving life sentences without the possibility of parole, compared to just 13.6% of
Louisiana’s overall adult correctional population.266 The severity of these sentences and
the significant proportion of inmates with a life sentence due to this unconstitutional
practice reinforce the reasons why Louisiana should heed its former Chief Justice’s words
to “address the racial stain of [its] own history” by granting retroactivity.267
Furthermore, the legal community in Louisiana has already taken steps to redress
such harm by initiating legal campaigns to promote retroactive application of Ramos. PJI
258
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has not only identified a significant number of prisoners currently incarcerated through
non-unanimous jury verdicts in Louisiana, but they have also secured representation from
over 150 lawyers willing to represent these individuals.268 With legal representation
already in place, Louisiana has a responsibility to ensure that those individuals convicted
with non-unanimous jury verdicts receive all possible constitutional protections to ensure
the validity of their convictions and corresponding sentences.
Like Louisiana’s, Oregon’s non-unanimous jury law has racist roots that have
perpetuated the racial disparities that exist in Oregon’s criminal justice system.269 Racial
minorities are similarly underrepresented on juries and overrepresented as criminal
defendants.270 While Oregon has not identified every person in its prisons who was
convicted by a non-unanimous jury verdict, the Oregon legal community is attempting to
equip prisoners and pro bono attorneys with all the legal resources they need to file postconviction petitions challenging such verdicts.271 With an organized system to file and
support these petitions in place, the Ramos dissent’s fear that neither Louisiana’s nor
Oregon’s legal system would be able to handle the influx of retroactivity claims is likely
overblown.272 Oregon should similarly redress the effects of its racist law by granting
retroactivity to all prisoners convicted with a non-unanimous jury verdict.
CONCLUSION
When ruling that non-unanimous jury verdicts were unconstitutional, the Ramos
Court declared that “[a] verdict, taken from eleven, [i]s no verdict at all.”273 The Court
came to this conclusion due to “the need to ensure, in keeping with the Nation’s oldest
traditions, fair and dependable adjudications of a defendant’s guilt.”274 Though Ramos
made crystal clear that a unanimous jury verdict is an essential element of the jury trial
right, Edwards minimized this right’s fundamental nature and cast aside its watershed
status. In so doing, the Court denied relief to hundreds of prisoners who were convicted
based on an unconstitutional law because “the costs imposed upon the States by retroactive
application of new rules of constitutional law on habeas corpus . . . generally far outweigh
the benefits of this application.”275 Though concurring in the judgment, Justice Gorsuch
acknowledged that, while the Court may have come to such a conclusion regarding laws
that do not personally affect them, “many other rules of criminal procedure this Court has
found less than ‘fundamental’ since Teague seem anything but that to those whose lives
they affect.”276
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While Justice Gorsuch’s above acknowledgment should persuade state courts to
seriously consider granting retroactivity, his statements in Ramos provide even more
motivation: “Every judge must learn to live with the fact he or she will make some
mistakes; it comes with the territory. But it is something else entirely to perpetuate
something we all know to be wrong only because we fear the consequences of being
right.”277 It is likely that applying Ramos retroactively will pose challenges for Louisiana
and Oregon as they determine how to move forward with re-trials and other subsequent
hurdles that stem from granting retroactivity. However, the cost of giving new trials to all
defendants convicted by non-unanimous juries “pales in comparison to the long-term
societal cost of perpetuating—by our own inaction—a deeply-ingrained distrust of law
enforcement, criminal justice, and . . . government institutions.”278 By rejecting the nonunanimous jury verdict and accepting that it is “no verdict at all,” state courts must accept
the reality that no non-unanimous jury verdict conviction should stand, no matter the
difficulty this decision poses. That is the consequence of being right. That is the
consequence of justice.
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